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ABSTRACT. A common opinion is that power has
shifted from states to companies. This article discusses
quantitative and qualitative aspects of power possessed by
companies and by states. A more adequate comparison
than that between company sales and gross national
product is the one between company value added and
GNP. Also more adequate is the comparison between the
public sector and company net profit. These rival mea-
sures take down company power to about a tenth of the
sales measure. Also in qualitative terms the ‘‘exit power’’
of the company gives a low impact compared to gov-
ernmental action and the article concludes that company
power by common measures is overestimated. However,
the aggregated long-term effect of the market economy
on the development of society is most significant. But it is
a mistake to use that judgment as an argument for the
opinion that business executives are the major power
holders in modern societies. Perceptions of power also
have an impact on which expectations and commitments
that can be judged as realistic and therefore the issue of
power is central for the normative discussion about cor-
porate social responsibility.
KEY WORDS: power holders, corporatism, economic
influence, executive power, responsibility
Introduction
Staggering numbers of multimillion sales are often
used in the public debate as illustrations of the big and
growing power of the multinational enterprises
(MNEs). The dictator of a small country seems to
have substantially less power and this impression is
then used as a stepping-stone for the further analysis
(Boda, 2002). Neocolonialism is not politically cor-
rect, but there are hopes and demands for multina-
tionals to influence Third World countries to adjust
to widely praised norms such as human rights (Klein,
2000). Also for problems in the developed world,
there are hopes that companies will provide solutions
that governments have been unwilling or unable to
solve. The high estimate of corporate power is the
fundamental basis for the expectations, demands, and
commitments that are manifested in the debate about
corporate social responsibility (CSR).
A statement of the Swedish insurance company
Skandia can illustrate the link between corporate
responsibility and power: ‘‘Since the world’s eco-
nomic development resources are in the hands of the
companies, they are recognizing that they must take
greater responsibility for global and local develop-
ment matters’’. (Skandia Annual Report 2001, p.
48). There is little to say against this reasoning if one
assumes that the premise is correct. But the con-
clusion is very dependent upon the premise.
Responsibility is close to the construction ‘‘re-
sponse-ability’’ when the focus is on the second part;
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the ability to respond or not to respond. Without
this ability the attitude to response itself looses its
practical relevance. It also opens for philosophical
objections like Kant’s dictum that an ought implies a
can (Kant, 1797). This article discusses the realism of
the high estimate of corporate power.
A shift of power?
James Carville, Bill Clinton’s election campaign
manager in 1992, made a reflection about power: ‘‘I
used to think, that if there was reincarnation, I
wanted to come back as the president, or the pope.
But now I want to be the bond market; you can
intimidate everybody’’ (The Economist, 1995, p.
13). This quote illustrates some ideas about power.
Power is seen as shifted, but not distinctly from
people in some positions to people in other posi-
tions, but from fixed places and persons to diffuse
institutions and power holders. Is not a reincarnated
soul in need of a body of flesh and blood?
Governments in the past had the power of con-
trolling the exchange rate, but then the interest rate
adjusted to the market. Or instead governments
could fix the interest rate, but then the market
would adjust the exchange rates. For some products
governments stipulated the price, but then the
quantity supplied by the market decreased or in-
creased with the level of the price.
To some people this control of one factor is a sign
of the good old times when the government had
power. A main reason for liberalization is that many
politicians started to downgrade this power over one
factor when the outcome was disappointing. Not
only center-right but also many center-left govern-
ments moved towards deregulation (Soros, 1998). It
could be better that both exchange rate and interest
rate were adjusted by the market rather than just one
of them.
The advance of science has followed the dictum
of Bacon, ‘‘Nature to be commanded must be
obeyed’’. The old laws of economics claimed that
you could borrow money only as long as you had a
capacity to pay back. But in the end of the 90s these
laws appeared less stern when small IT-companies
could sell shares for billions even if they never
showed a dollar of profit. If the market can provide
money for that, why not for governmental programs
even if there is no sign of balance between costs and
taxes? Economic restrictions looked less like laws,
but more like arbitrary decisions imposed by some
financial market yuppies.
This liberation of political will from economic
restriction has occurred before. Juan Peron, the
leftwing dictator of Argentina, claimed that the
restriction on politics that economists insisted on had
no real foundation. The government does not need
to ‘‘tax and spend’’, but the more popular policy of
just spending works even better: ‘‘Give to the peo-
ple, especially the workers, all that is possible. When
it seems that already you are giving them too much,
give them more. You will see the result. Everyone
will try to scare you with the specter of economic
collapse. But all that is a lie. There is nothing more
elastic than the economy which everyone fears so
much because no one understands it’’ (Fukuyama,
1992, p. 106). In hindsight we can conclude that the
Peron economics did not succeed, and Argentina has
been a slow learner.
From time to time the idea of economic con-
straints because nature ‘‘must be obeyed’’ is replaced
by the idea that economic power players are
inflicting a negative illusion which restricts the po-
sitive will of politicians. If the issue becomes a
question of sufficient positive will, a possible solu-
tion would be that corporate managers switch to a
positive attitude. If optimistic leaders are what is
needed, business can certainly provide a lot of
executives with optimism as well as high spend-
ing inclination. But do they have the economic
muscles?
Quantitative powers
If comparing company revenues with national GNP,
the multinationals look like midsize countries –
Exxon has a slightly higher number than Turkey and
Ford’s is higher than Poland’s. Zolt Boda (2002, p.
239) summarizes the overall picture by observing
that of the 100 largest entities, measured this way,
more than fifty are companies. Some company
executives make presentations that emphasize com-
pany strength even more. Sir John Browne, CEO of
BP Amoco, makes a comparison supporting per-
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ceptions of company dominance: ‘‘… when the 10
largest companies in the world including BP Amoco,
each have an annual turnover in excess of the gross
national product of more than 150 of the 185
members of the United Nations that perception is
inevitable and understandable’’ (Browne, 1999).
My point is not that another impression will be
created if calculating, for example, how many of the
largest companies that will be needed to receive
aggregated revenue equal to the GNP of one of the
10 largest nations. The issue at task is to ask if the
comparison of company revenue and GNP has rel-
evance. Let me start with two entities of the same size
according to this measurement. In 2002 the GNP of
Sweden was $240 billion (Statistics Sweden) and
Shell’s revenue was $236 billion (Shell, Annual Re-
port). Shell’s revenue is 98% of the Swedish GNP.
A multinational oil company can serve as an
instructive example of how revenue is overrating
company size. Often the situation of oil exploration
has a design as follows. Out of a crude price of $25 a
barrel, costs are $4 and the $21 profit is split between
the state, which receives $20, and the company, $1.
The revenue of a crude selling company is to a large
extent the company collecting money for the benefit
of the state. When selling in the industrialized
countries there is a similar situation. Both the gross
and net margin for the company are rather modest
and a fraction of the taxes that the producer and the
consumer countries add to the price. If one adheres
to the common advise of detective stories ‘‘follow
the money’’, it seems that a minor part goes to the
companies. The political rational for attributing high
prices on companies is easy to understand. But it is
important to make efforts getting magnitudes
straight instead of strengthening this misconception
of all the money pouring into company pockets.
To claim that the company, being the last link in a
value chain, is holding all the power is an unjustified
simplification. This is especially evident for oil
companies but applies also for other companies.
When just regarding sales one ignores the level of
integration of the whole production process and the
impact of downsizing. It is more appropriate to see
the value added by the company as its economic
performance and also as the indication of its power.
Value added is often labeled gross margin, margin, or
gross profit in annual reports. The gross profit of
Shell for 2002 was $28.2 billion (Shell Annual Re-
port). That number corresponds to 12% of the
Swedish GNP.
A third possibility would be to compare the
amount available for social spending. For the com-
pany the net profit will be the amount of money that
could be used for something benevolent and for a
country it would be the amount that taxpayers have
paid to the state. Both states and companies have
competing obligations for these amounts, but in a
broad sense this is what is available for spending. The
net profit of Shell, $9.4 billion, can be compared to
the total taxes of Sweden amounting to $124 billion.
This third measure quantifies Shell’s resources to 8%
of the Swedish.
A fourth measure is to compare the workforces.
Worldwide Shell has 111 thousand employees which
amounts to 2.6% of the 4.250 thousand employed in
Sweden. Thus, in general comparison of workforce
gives lower proportions of MNEs than the three
previous measures. However such a comparison, also
with a developed country like Sweden, underesti-
mates the economic significance of MNEs. But
measurement by sales overrates them grossly, so I
would not recommend using that one either. In my
judgment, value added would be the most appro-
priate number for comparison.
In addition to the comparison of company net
profit with taxes/public spending it can also be
useful to look into the development over time of
public spending. A reason for that is that one part of
the discussion about increasing company power is
the claim that the public sector is shrinking and
power and resources are transferred from the public
to the private sector (e.g. Korten, 1996; Saul, 1998).
A quantitative way of measuring the economic
activity of governments would be to follow its share
of the GNP, and when so doing there is no sign of a
change from the public to the private sector, but a
continuous development in the opposite direction.
On average, the government spending in the most
important industrial countries has changed from
8.3% of GNP in 1870, to 20.7% in 1937, to 27.9% in
1960 and to 42.6% in 1980. During the rightwing
1980s and the globalization of the 1990s the trend
has not been reversed. The public share was 44.8%
in 1990 and 45.9% in 1996 (The Economist 1997, p.
11, IMF-statistics).
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Company Philanthropy could also be mentioned
as a specific component. Carroll and Buchholtz
(2003) attribute significant expectations on compa-
nies for philanthropy, classing such activities as a
forth component of company responsibility after
economic, legal and ethical responsibilities. The
PerCent Club in Britain is promoting donations of
0.5% of pretax profits (Moore, 2003). In the USA
the social screening company KLD gives good
behavior points to companies giving 1.5% of pretax
profits to charity (Waddock, 2002, p. 207). Some
people think these are nice gestures. One might have
different normative opinions about these actions and
ambitions, but descriptively it ought to be evident
that this is a most marginal activity in the economy
of society.
Financial transaction numbers are a lot more
impressive, even more so than the sales of the
multinational enterprises. One day’s trade of cur-
rency often exceeds one trillion dollars (Giscard
d’Estaing, 2002). That amount surpasses the
combined reserves of the world’s central banks. One
estimate is that global financial transactions are 360
times larger than commercial transactions (Ugart-
eche, 2000, p. 159). That implies that money-trad-
ing volume dwarfs the GNP of USA, but such a
relation would not only support economic megalo-
mania, but illustrates the limitations of these kinds of
comparisons.
Disraeli is often attributed the saying that there are
three kinds of lies: ‘‘lies, damned lies and statistics’’.
The reckless ways of measuring company power can
be seen as an illustration. A more sober comparison
would bring Shell down from 98% of Sweden to a
more modest 12%.
Using economic power
A difference of kind rather than size is that the states
have a more ultimate power over a territory with the
control of force, while companies are always sub-
ordinated to that power. One potential source of
power is ‘‘voice’’ (Hirschman, 1970) which might
have some effects in a democracy, whereas one of
the privileges of a dictator is that he does not need to
listen. The diplomatic talent of company executives
will probably not be decisive in major questions.
Then we come to the force of ‘‘exit’’ (Hirschman,
1970). For some people an analogy that might come
to mind is a bank threatening to cancel the loans of a
private person. But when looking at the walk-away
power of a MNE there is a need for some revision
about who is getting hurt. An exit from trade or
production will hurt the regime but new partners
will limit the impact. As a primitive adjustment a
withdrawal of a $100 million in trade/production
might inflict a loss of say $10 million on the pun-
ished government. A company is never the only
choice so an abandoned government will find an-
other trading partner, foreign or national, but that
partner will probably demand some more favorable
terms or will be less apt in some other respect.
It is reasonable to expect a larger impact from a
politically coordinated boycott. Here alternative
companies will be harder to find, so maybe a $100
million cut inflicts a $50 million loss. A third kind of
economic sanction is likely to have even more im-
pact, such as a cut of foreign aid of $100 million
would imply a loss of $100 million. During the cold
war, the other superpower or some of its allies were
likely to show up as a new patron, but now a country
deprived of aid because of human rights violations
would have problems finding a replacing donor.
However, threats by donors are seldom carried
out despite their ability to hurt the most. A major
reason for this and the limited success of economic
sanctions is that others than the ruling group carry
the most devastating burden of the inflicted pun-
ishment. Redistribution of resources in dictatorships
limits the impact upon the ruling group and the
people most hardly hit are generally the ordinary or
the very poor citizens that the action is supposed to
help. The international political community has not
been very effective in economic boycotts and the
Saddams and the Castros prevail for long times.
Are then companies able to be effective guardians
of human rights? With less efficient means, compa-
nies have limited possibilities of arm twisting and in
any conflict the suffering of the third party, the
population, is a countervailing factor to consider. If
this third party does not get hurt, it is an indication
that the company’s act was symbolic. Little harm has
been inflicted but unfortunately the pressure on the
government has probably been quite insignificant. If
more pressure is applied by the company this is likely
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to inflict damage on the third party. Normatively, it
is disputable if companies – instead of a democratic
political body – should make such calculations of
direct negative effects versus possible political gains.
Resentment in the Third World for ‘‘western
imperialism’’ is likely to remain and the perceived
unity in ideas as democracy and human rights is
superficial (Huntington, 2002). It is hardly realistic
to expect such resentment to be weaker if this
western imperialism is managed by companies in-
stead of nations.
In addition to normative doubts about company
activism there are also efficiency considerations.
Presently the regime in Myanmar is a major target for
company action (Klein, 2000). The isolation of the
regime and the limited economic importance of the
country have caused many companies to abort their
business rather than fight the NGOs insisting on their
withdrawal. The boycott itself has so far been less
successful than the recruitment to the boycott.
A company’s decision about where to trade and
invest can influence its image and brand. But that is a
separate question of a lesser magnitude and more of a
policy to keep away from bad companions and avoid
guilt by association. It is often claimed that a com-
pany’s presence helps the government more than the
people, but that seems debatable. Trade and pro-
duction are hardly the most suspected kinds of
interaction with a dictatorship, but loans are. In
addition to being supportive to the present gov-
ernment, the loans will be an additional burden for a
future, hopefully more democratic and enlightened,
government that could spend money more wisely.
Governments, not companies, have both the
sharpest tools and perform the ethically most dubious
interaction with dictatorships – giving them credits
bilaterally or multilaterally. There are difficulties with
using economic strength against economically weak
regimes. It seems likely that a boycott by companies
motivated by human rights concerns would be much
harder to sustain than an embargo by UN. Even if
succeeding to accomplish such actions, and given a
significant impact, there is no guarantee that the
dictator will give in rather than letting his people
suffer. The embargo against the Saddam regime in
Iraq cost many lives. The problems are even greater
for companies because these lack both the power and
the authority for such missions.
Irresponsible politicians?
The previous two parts have discussed quantative
aspects and the potential impacts of company and
state power. A further aspect discussed in this section
is the difference in personal power position between
politicians and corporate executives. Do these two
kinds of leaders differ in the use of the power po-
tential of their organizations? Are there restrictions
for them to materialize their beliefs and wants?
Many politicians opt for the easy solution of being
in favor of all nice things but distance themselves
from everything that can be perceived as unpleasant
even if such measures are necessary components to
obtain a desirable goal. Instead of advocating pack-
ages with positive and negative features for their
positive total effects, the emphasis is on the good,
and the negative is something either unavoidable or
decided by somebody else. Many European politi-
cians are in favor of the EU, but Brussels has now
made them powerless and all negative features are
against their will. Globalization is not a choice, but a
destiny and immigration is often described as a moral
imperative according to human rights obligations
rather than a political choice. Governments are tied
in many ways and one leach is hold by the market.
Are we witnessing vanishing states or just politicians
avoiding responsibility?
This changing of the world is a way for center left
parties to ditch old ideas without offending nostalgic
voters. The left insists that those ideas were not
wrong as the right claims, but rather good values and
good policies that must be changed in a radically
changing world. The politicians are forced to do
something they do not really want to do. What they
want are the votes of those liking the old values as
well as the votes of those liking the new policies.
But also the center right uses arguments of non-
volunteer character. Market reform in New Zealand
was called ‘‘Tina’’ standing for ‘‘there is no alter-
native’’. In Sweden the center right reforms in the
early 1990s were termed ‘‘the only way’’. One
would expect political parties to claim there are at
least two alternatives. The reason for a party
deserving the votes is that it has the guts to promote
the better alternative, also when this implies the
ordination of a medicine, that is generally considered
having a bitter taste.
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Often the representatives of the people seem to
see themselves more as appointed to a role of sym-
pathetic lawyer than as appointed to a jury or as a
judge. The lawyer makes an enthusiastic case for her
client’s needs and wants, but normally she is not the
decision-maker. Something or someone is holding
back. The judge and jury are outside the parliament.
Are company executives the ones who have the real
power in their hands?
There are some changes that can give a sense of
less governmental power. The liberal society is more
anonymous both in economics and politics than the
old authoritarian state. The king was less of a mul-
tiheaded institution than the parliament and the
market; one person was clearly in charge. The
freedom of decision-makers has decreased since rules
are institutionalized. Also these rules might be clas-
sified as whims or will when taken, but when in
place they hinder decision-makers to make very
different judgments in similar cases. Tax money is
allocated in advance and much expenditure is
indexed. The amount of money for discretionary
spending is limited.
It might be argued that the executive is restricted
by the market when taking economic decisions, and
that the politician is restricted by the democratic
system, but when the executive takes political
decisions he is more free. In my judgment he seems
to be under the same media pressure as the politi-
cian. He is not under the threat of loosing a general
election but the main danger for the executive as for
the politician is that he might be removed by his
superiors, if considered a liability. The restriction by
external pressure is not very different when taking
decisions of public interest. But when it gets to
power at disposition the situations are very different.
The politician decides and the executive adjusts. In
addition to the power deficit the executive also
suffers from a mandate deficit.
Opinions of the media and the risk of irritating
ordinary people are also a restriction on the public
decision-maker. Opportunism and populism stop
him from doing the things he would like to do.
However, from a democratic point of view these
limitations of governmental power can hardly be
seen as impairment, but certainly, the politicians
perceive them as restrictions. Furthermore, none of
these limitations are initiated from business nor have
these limitations transferred power to companies.
Rather companies have been under the same kind of
changes. Globalization has not only opened new
markets for the company, but also increased the
pressure from competition in the company’s old
markets. Rosabeth Moss Kanter writes: ‘‘The world
is becoming a shopping mall in which ideas and
products are available everywhere at the same time.
This puts the power of choice in the hands of
consumers, changing the terms of competition for
ever’’ (Kanter, 1995, p. 37). This power shift lim-
iting the power of companies is not perceived by the
anti-globalization agitation, but in more reflective
work like Norberg (2001).
As discussed above several factors combine to
motivate the politician to play down her power. For
the business executive the situation is very different.
In business power is not only linked to responsibility
but to better possibilities to make money. If the
company is powerful that motivates more concession
from other companies in business negotiations. If the
executive is seen as powerful he is Mr Right, a
person it is worthwhile to negotiate with and make
concessions to. Apart from when merger proposals
are investigated by authorities maintaining trade
competition, there are few good reasons for an
executive to restrict perception overestimating his
personal power or the power of his company. Per-
sonal vanity pulls in the same direction. Executives
confirm or exaggerate power attributed to them
while politicians play down their power to avoid
criticism from dissatisfied citizens. As John F. Ken-
nedy remarked: ‘‘Success has many fathers while
failure is an orphan’’. In politics few policies are solid
successes but there are at least some consequences for
which it is tempting for politicians to deny power
and responsibility.
Long-term transformation
Surprisingly, one major experience is missing in the
present discussion about capitalism and globalization
– that trade brings nations closer. To intellectuals of
the enlightenment like Montesquieu (1748) and
Thomas Paine (1776) this political benefit was evi-
dent. Montesquieu wrote that ‘‘Peace is the natural
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effect of trade’’ (Holmes, 1993, p. 217). Despite a
few hundred years of supporting evidence this in-
sight seems to be lost. A lot of wars took place
during the last century, but not one of them was
between two democratic capitalistic countries
(Rummel, 1998). Despite this experience a message
of old time religion is repeated: ‘‘Money is the root
of all evil’’.
The positive long-term revolutionary capacity of
capitalism is impressing. Capitalistic wealth and its
way of functioning have been a strong influence for
democratic development. In country after country
capitalism has shown itself to be a necessary – but
unfortunately not a sufficient condition – for
democracy (Wilson, 1995). The capitalist influence
has not been in telling the ruler what to do, but in a
gradual transformation of society. Business cannot
hinder governments from executing opposition
representatives or attacking their neighbors. But they
seem to influence a gradual development towards
democracy. This is done by capitalism as a structure
and a social force, not by managers ordering kings or
telling bureaucrats what to do.
Tocqueville wrote that the main damage illiberal
governments caused was not what they stole, but the
production they hindered (de Tocqueville, 1840).
Business is not protected by its power to resist but by
the contributions of its productivity. Sustaining
productivity is the main motivation for politicians in
dictatorships as in democracies to limit their own
interference.
The formula for democracy seems to be a rising
middle class step by step engulfing and democratiz-
ing the old ruling elite. In that light, isolation
through political or company initiative does not
seem to be a promising path. By just operating in a
country an international company is likely to give a
positive contribution. However, the progressive
solution seems to be using business managers as
culture infiltrators, not as stand-in politicians or
policemen.
A more activist policy was the company actions
following the Sullivan principles in South Africa
1977–1987. General Motors (where Leon Sullivan
was a board member) and other companies declared
that they would not follow the segregation laws but
treat, pay and promote their employees regardless of
race and they would also in other ways agitate
against apartheid. The regime accepted this disobe-
dience. By 1986, no less than 172 of the 280
American companies in South Africa had joined
this initiative. After 10 years Leon Sullivan himself
changed his recommendation and suggested disin-
vestment, an advice that was followed by
GM and several other companies (De George,
1999).
Sullivan overestimated the short-term impact of
these actions, expecting the divergent behavior of
these companies to destabilize the regime. When this
did not happen he abandoned the principles.
Despite this defection, I think it is reasonable to
think that the presence of these companies between
1977 and 1987 did more good than harm. One
reason for such a judgment is that they provided
some experience for people working in racially
integrated companies, which should be useful for the
new regime. A speculation is that this inclusion of
blacks might have contributed to the shift of ANC
from a socialist to a more pro-capitalist ideology. I
think Sullivan was right in his hypothesis of culture
infiltration, but he made a mistake in expecting fast,
short-term effects.
As previously discussed the ‘‘exit power’’ of a
company is very limited. A government already
criticized for offences of human rights will draw only
limited additional criticisms for infringing company
rights. Nationalization, price control, special taxes
are all tools at the government’s disposal. At the
moment of investment the company has other op-
tions, but when the investment is made this opera-
tion is more dependent on the state than vice versa.
The executive does not hold much of personal
political power and this weakness contrasts to the
significant long-term aggregated influence of the
economic system. Sometimes these judgments of
two different perspectives are mixed up and signif-
icant long-term effects are taken to imply short-term
executive power.
Conclusions
The company does not have an antagonistic relation
with consumers and employees but nor a harmony of
interest. Regardless of the salary paid every employee
has some reasons for why he or she should have a little
Illusions of Corporate Power 331
more. There are always a lot of goods that the con-
sumer cannot afford because the company asks a bit
more than he can afford. The citizen often feels that
the power of companies exceeds his own and that the
state can be an ally. But in a conflict between the
citizen and the state the power discrepancy is much
larger. The problem then is that the company is too
weak an ally to give any significant support. That the
state, but not the companies, often is seen as a helping
hand is not an indication that companies are more
powerful than the state, but the reverse. It is homage
to the supremacy of the state.
Why politicians tend to complain about a lack of
power has been discussed. But there is more behind
this than marketing a will to do good but being
hindered by insufficient power to do so. Bureau-
cratization and centralization are some real factors
limiting the influence of the ordinary politician. But
these changes are not imposed by companies but
decided by politicians themselves and nor do they
transfer power to companies. Rather companies face
a similar development. Many managers feel that they
are loosing power because of centralization to the
top, but also by horizontal interference. If stacked in
a matrix chart constrained by powerful stakeholders
and massive legislation, the freedom of action ap-
pears quite limited.
If many people feel less powerful it seems rea-
sonable to suspect that there has indeed been a major
power transfer. It is rather the insignificance of the
business leader in the public domain that has made
him the illusive stranger that must have received this
transferred power. Business leaders are certainly
interested in power and they see the attribution of
power as flattering and seducing. However, promises
are misleading if one has neither the ability nor the
means to fulfil the expectations. The exaggerated
ideas about company power are dangerous in
themselves and become even more so if company
executives pretend they are justified. When both
parties are involved in a description of reality it is
easy to take a unity in power attribution as a con-
firmation that this description is correct.
There are many reasons to argue for a link be-
tween power and responsibility. The descriptive is-
sue of power is therefore of prime interest for the
normative question of what companies should be
responsible to do. If this article has succeeded in its
purpose, it has challenged the view of a major shift of
power from political bodies to companies. The
quantitative size of company economics compared
to country economics is distorted when comparing
sales to GNP. The more justified measurement value
added to GNP brings down the size of the company
in the discussed example from 98 to 12%.
Regardless of being leftwing or rightwing there
is a theoretical aversion to companies acting in
cartels rather than competing. Surprisingly some
popular ideas hold that company collaboration
should be the solution to a number of social,
political and environmental problems. In line with
both liberal and anti-liberal theory, nobody expects
companies to solve a lot of political problems. But
if media claim that business is responsible and if
business leaders frequently assert that the public has
these expectations and they will comply to these
expectations, this new responsibility might become
the general perception (Henderson, 2001, p. 73).
Pretending that some social responsibility in the
boardroom is the solution might lead to two
problems. The most serious is that no solution is
formed. Secondly it misdirects responsibility for this
failure, further delaying adequate measures. Blaming
a bystander has seldom cut to the hart of a problem.
The perception of companies and executives as
the rulers of the world is a dangerous misconcep-
tion.
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